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The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas
Sayre A. Swarztrauber, Captain, U.S. Navy, Naval Institute Press, An-
napolis, Maryland. 1972 xii, 316 pp., $12.50.
Reviewed by Myres S. McDougal, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law
School.
In this distinguished little book, dedicated "with hope" to "the sailors
and statesmen of all flags engaged in the search for a workable and equi-
table international law of the sea," a senior United States naval officer
offers a definitive history of, and obituary for, the once generally accepted
"three-mile limit" of the territorial sea.
The author states his purpose as being "to produce a history of the
three-mile limit as a rule of international law" (p. 2), and in prefatory
reflection finds nothing to alter "the thesis that the three-mile limit has
passed into history" (p. xi). The promise of the book, quite ambitiously, is
to "ascertain and document the conditions under which the rule came into
existence, the course of, and reasons for, its rise to paramountcy, and the
circumstances that led to its demise" (p. 2).
In organization, the book "follows a simple chronological narrative"
and "within each major topical or chronological subdivision," in documen-
tation of its thesis and supporting arguments, it collates and considers "the
actual practice of states-court decisions, laws, treaties and the like," and
"the work of publicists and learned societies" (p. 8).
The general problem which underlies the technical legal materials with
which Captain Swarztrauber is concerned is that of how a boundary is to
be drawn between the comprehensive, exclusive competence of coastal
states and the inclusive, shared competence of the general community of
states with respect to the use and enjoyment of the oceans of the world.
In appraisal we must, accordingly, inquire how comprehensively and
accurately he describes past practice in relation to this problem, how
realistically he accounts for the factors affecting decision, and how com-
prehensively and rationally he clarifies general community policies for the
guidance of future decision.
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The author's description of past practice is, within the limits he sets for
his study, superlative. The survey he offers of the rise and demise of the
three-mile limit is both minutely detailed and masterly.
In depicting the rise of the three-mile rule, the author first sketches in
the background of the Roman notion of the sea, as communis omnium
naturalijure and of the later claims by different communities to territorial
sovereignty over vast reaches of waters, concluding with the famous con-
troversy between Grotius and Selden over mare liberum and mare clau-
SUm.
The origins of the three-mile limit in more modest claim to coastal
waters are then traced, most meticulously, through the cannon-shot rule
designed to protect neutrality, the line-of-sight doctrine whose "primary
function was to provide a protective or security-belt around the littoral
state" (p. 42), and several conceptions of "marine leagues" whose purpose
was to secure coastal monopolies in fishing.
The earliest explicit references to "three miles" are found in British
"hovering acts" (for protection against smuggling), Scandinavian decrees
against privateering, French Foreign Office equations of the range of can-
non-shot with three miles, and a 1782 monograph by the Italian jurist,
Galiani, popularizing the same equation as made by the French Foreign
Office.
An important official imprimatur is seen in the 1793 assertion, and
incorporation into its domestic laws, by the United States, of a three-mile
limit for the purpose of protecting its neutrality. It was, however, Great
Britain with her immense sea power and the Pax Brittanica she imposed for
a hundred years, the author finds, who by her claims and practices, con-
curred in and emulated by most of the other great powers, brought the
three-mile limit to its "zenith" as an established rule of international law in
the first quarter of the twentieth century.
The demise of the three-mile limit, precipitous as it has been, the author
traces through several chronological stages. A "Pandora's Box" was
opened at The Hague Conference of 1930, when many states gave different
answers to the question of what the width of the territorial sea should be,
and it became apparent that "the great powers were no longer committed
to the enforcement of the three-mile limit" (pp. 133, 140). During the
interwar period states began to make demands for zones of different widths
for different particular purposes, such as for protection against smuggling
or the monopolization of fish, and the "contiguous zone" became estab-
lished doctrine.
During World War 11, the American states claimed an enormous con-
tiguous zone, extending out as much as 1,200 miles, for protecting their
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neutrality; and shortly after the war, in 1945, President Truman made his
influential proclamations about the continental shelf and coastal fisheries
which, however much they may have been misunderstood or deliberately
misinterpreted, "dealt a crippling blow to the three-mile limit" (162). The
Soviet Union continued to press for its 12-mile limit, and some newly
independent states made claims of varying widths. In the Anglo-Norwe-
gian Fisheries case (1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116) the International Court of
Justice, surprisingly, authorized an extraordinary expansion of internal
waters, at the expense of the high seas, for coasts of irregular formation.
Most importantly, several Latin-American states, in alleged emulation of
President Truman, vigorously asserted claims of ambiguous content ex-
tending to widths of as much as 200 miles. A host of controversies about
fisheries and security in widely scattered areas of the globe, continued to
exacerbate expectations and to undermine agreement about the "extent
and nature of territorial waters" (p. 203). The failure of the 1958 and 1960
United Nations Conferences On the Law of the Sea demonstrated again
that "the representatives of the states of the world had been unable to
reach agreement," and, after a "cumulative debilitating effect," ultimately
"did mortal damage to the three-mile limit" (pp. 217, 228).
The final demise of the three-mile limit came, the author finds, in the
practices and irresolution of the United States which, having succeeded
Great Britain as the world's foremost naval power and potential champion
of a narrow territorial sea, chose itself to demand a large number of special
purpose zones in excess of three miles and failed in its determination to
oppose the Russian claim of 12 miles and the Latin-American claims of
200 miles for more comprehensive purposes.
The principal omission in all this excellent survey of past practice is that
the author is, within his stated scope and purpose, more concerned with
describing the exclusive claims and interests of states in extending their
own particular territorial seas, than with outlining the inclusive interests of
all states in the maintenance of the narrowest possible territorial seas, by
whomsoever claimed.
It may be that these latter inclusive interests are not as often explicitly
expressed as direct community claims against the expansionist, exclusive
claims as they should be, but the inclusive interests are always present,
though the claims be left unstated, and are of no less importance to the
whole global community than are the exclusive interests and claims.
It is possible, further, that in his presentation of the factors that have
affected the rise and demise of the three-mile limit Captain Swarztrauber,
with pardonable professional bias, somewhat exaggerates the role played
by the rise and decline of British and United States naval power (pp. 65,
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126, 244). Law must in any community of course in the long run, in
measure reflect the dispositions of effective power within that community.
There are, however, forms of power other than naval power, and within
any community, national or international, authority, in the sense of peo-
ples' demands and expectations about how power should be exercised, is
itself a most important form of power.
It could be that one of the significant variables in the general commu-
nity's insistence upon a narrow territorial sea, with the contraction of
coastal monopoly, for so many decades was in the perception by the
peoples of the world of their tremendous inclusive benefits from the shared
enjoyment of a great shareable resource. The decline of the three-mile limit
could, complementarily, be attributed to a failure in peoples' under-
standing- brought on by lack of appropriate organization, ideological dis-
sension, rapidity in technological change, and so on-of the conditions
under which they can secure the potential multiplier benefits in the enjoy-
ment of such a resource.
It is possible, again, that in his mode of presentation of the basic
community policies at stake, Captain Swarztrauber may somewhat under-
emphasize the inclusive interests of all peoples in keeping territorial seas as
narrow as possible. In his concluding chapter on "Prospects and Recom-
mendations" he strongly urges that the "high seas," apparently including
the seabed and subsoil, beyond a twelve-mile limit of territorial waters,
which he regards as the narrowest negotiable, should be "treated as res
communes, available for the use and common welfare of all states and
peoples." (pp. 256, 257) He adds that for "international regulation of
exploitation and conservation," the "narrower the territorial sea, the larger
and more effective the conservation areas" (p. 257).
In earlier passages in his book, however, he appears to suggest that with
the development of contiguous zones for fisheries and security the width of
the territorial sea has become largely irrelevant (pp. 235, 252). Thus, he
finds that for "many states, particularly less-developed states, and those
which rely heavily on the living resources of the sea, virtually the sole
significance of the legal regime of littoral waters- whether they are termed
the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, or the maritime belt-is the extent
to which they provide exclusive fishing rights" (235). Similarly, with re-
spect to the United States he adds that, because of the many contiguous
zones it claims of greater width than three miles, "the importance that the
United States attaches to its "residual" three-mile limit now focuses solely
around the right of innocent passage of warships" (p. 240).
The significance and importance of the width of the territorial sea for the
United States and other states, is not of course confined to the exclusive
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interests that a claiming state can secure for itself in a particular width, but
rather extends to the inclusive interests which all states share in restricting
claims to extravagant widths which interfere with both historic freedoms,
as in transportation and communication, and emerging new uses, as in
scientific inquiry, in the enjoyment of the oceans. From this perspective, it
makes, further, a tremendous difference whether a coastal state is claiming
the comprehensive competence of the "territorial sea" or the more selec-
tive competence of the "contiguous zone"; the former affords a monopolis-
tic control over resources and activities, save for the right of "innocent
passage," while the latter may be tailored to protect unique coastal in-
terests with the least possible damage to the inclusive interests of others.
It is not quite realistic, finally, to equate exclusive claims to the mineral
resources of the continental shelf with "200-mile fishing claims" (p. 255);
the one claim relates to exhaustible stock resources, requiring very specific
strategies in exploitation with attendant dangers to the coast, the other
claim relates to flow resources, which may or may not be exhaustible and
require very different strategies in exploitation, and certainly are not con-
trollable or amenable to conservation within the indicated geographic limit.
In his more specific recommendations Captain Swarztrauber rightly
stresses the importance of continued cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet Union, in the clarification of common interest in the
enjoyment of the oceans. The suggestion that the two states "spearhead a
plan to renounce all exclusive claims to the sea, the seabed, the subsoil
beyond the limit of territorial waters, contingent upon the conclusion of an
international convention regulating the expolitation of the living and miner-
al resources of the sea" (p. 256) would appear, however, to go beyond
what is practicable or necessary.
The device of limited exclusive competences-whether labelled "con-
tiguous zones," "continental shelves," or some other equivalent-may, as
indicated above, be made in particular instances to serve the common
interest in achieving an appropriate balance between exclusive coastal
interests and the more inclusive general community interests; properly
understood, the device of limited competences sets no precedent for extra-
vagant, comprehensive, exclusive claims.
In other specific recommendations Captain Swarztrauber emphasizes
the importance of an accommodation between the developed and devel-
oping states. He notes that many of the developing states "seem reluctant
to restrict voluntarily their sovereign rights and options to within a narrow
twelve-mile maritime belt, without some sort of assurance that theirs will
be a fair share of the great natural wealth in and under the deep, high seas
beyond" (p. 81). He might have added that the developing states are not
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likely to be able to increase their share in world economy and world
society, by promoting the coastal monopolization of the great storehouse of
potential values in the oceans.
It is the fact that the oceans are shareable-that by a few simple rules of
the road, the resources, the initiatives and the skills of all can be brought to
bear upon communication, transportation, fishing, scientific inquiry, and so
on, in the multiplied production of values-that has enabled the oceans to
contribute so greatly to world economy and world society.
It is not the historic freedoms of access to the oceans that have pre-
cluded some states from engaging in the productive enjoyment of that
resource, but rather many variables in organization upon the land masses.
The developing states can win, should anybody win, by policies of unilater-
al grab, only if the developed states do not engage in the same practices. If
all states grab, and few can be expected to abstain if others do grab, the
shareability of the resource and the multiplied production of values are
destroyed.
Devoutly as it might be wished, it is perhaps too much to hope that
Captain Swarztrauber is wrong and that the demise of the three-mile limit
is, as Mark Twain remarked of his reputed death, exaggerated. Even if,
however, this particular rule is dead, in a world increasingly interdependent
and increasingly hungry for all values, the interests and policies that have
so long underlain the rule, can be expected to survive and even intensify.
It is to be hoped that the peoples of the world will continue to make a
deliberate and reasoned search for the common interest, in a productive
and equitable balancing of both inclusive and exclusive claims to the
oceans. For all who do engage in such search Captain Swarztrauber's book
must, as he hoped in its dedication, offer eminent and invaluable contribu-
tion.
Peace In The Balance:
The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy
Eugene V. Rostow, Simon and Schuster, 1972, 352 pages $8.95.
Reviewed by L. J. Theberge
At a time when passions engendered by the Vietnam War have largely
subsided, "Peace in the Balance: The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy"
presents a careful exposition of the major antiwar positions, an analysis of
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their likely impact on U.S. foreign policy, and a justification of the foreign
policy decisions made during the Johnson Administration.
It is an excellent and refreshing book, excellent because it puts the war
in its proper perspective as part of the larger foreign policy issue, and
refreshing because the author does not suffer from "mea culpism," that
rare disease many officials in both the Kennedy and Johnson Adminis-
trations contracted as soon as they left government.
Mr. Rostow returned to the academic world as Professor of Law and
Public Affairs at Yale University, after serving as Undersecretary of State
for Political Affairs during the Johnson Administration, without either a
sense of guilt or a selective memory designed to minimize his involvement
in the policies of the administration he served.
The heart of "Peace in the Balance: The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy"
is the identification, exposition and analysis of seven schools of foreign
policy that Mr. Rostow measures against his own Balance-of-Power thesis.
Before reviewing these seven schools of thought it would be useful to
understand the historical perspective in which the Balance-of-Power thesis
developed.
Peace and security from foreign intervention are interrelated objectives
of rulers and nations. It is Mr. Rostow's thesis that the Napoleonic Wars
brought the realization to Europeans that uncoordinated responses on the
part of individual nations was an unsatisfactory method for preserving
peace. The Congress of Vienna established certain principles for maintain-
ing a Balance-of-Power in Europe and preventing any one nation or group
of nations from using force as an acceptable foreign policy device.
In essence a collective approach to peace evolved in the 19th century
wherein the more powerful members of Europe attempted to maintain a
balance-of-power through changing coalitions. It is in the context of the
Balance-of-Power that Mr. Rostow justifies the use or threatened use of
force by the U.S. in Vietnam, Korea, Cuba, Berlin and elsewhere, since it
is in our national interest to oppose the international use of force where
such force is likely to upset the Balance-of-Power.
It is within this historical framework and the developments since World
War I1, by which Russia assumed a dominant and imperialist role in world
affairs, that Mr. Rostow contends our foreign policy in Korea, Cuba and
Vietnam should be judged.
The first foreign policy school to be measured against Mr. Rostow's
thesis is pacifism which has always found considerable support in Ameri-
can intellectual life, due in part to the important role the Quakers have
played since the beginning of American history. Mr. Rostow seems to
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accept the view that non-resistance is not an alternative or viable policy,
but no policy at all, and he quickly dismisses pacifism.
The hard anti-communist or Dr. Strangelove school is the antithesis of
pacifism. It is also quickly dismissed as not being a viable alternative
policy, since it would lead directly to nuclear confrontation.
The third school is composed of the communists and fellow travelers of
a myriad of persuasions but with one central concept which is that the
United States does not have any legitimate national interest. Mr. Rostow
examines the arguments of three proponents of this school, and carefully
destroys their contentions that the United States is entirely to blame for
the cold war, that economic imperialism dominates U.S. foreign policy and
that only war in furtherance of world revolution is justified.
Isolationist sentiment has grown in the United States as a direct result of
our disillusionment with the burdens of world leadership. The isolation
school prefers the good old days when the English shouldered the burden
of peace and the United States was able, in condemning the English, to
assume a posture of moral superiority peculiar to disinterested parties.
If one accepts that there is something worth preserving in our political,
economic and social institutions, it is difficult to imagine how long our
civilization would survive without a countervailing power to communist
expansion. Isolationism appears attractive on the surface because it offers
the hope that one can cultivate his own garden without worrying about the
neighborhood going to pot.
A fifth school of thought, which Mr. Rostow labels neo-Wilsonian, also
adopts a moral tone. United States foreign policy should be directed
toward supporting governments whose political, economic and social views
are congenial to the political ideals of the particular neo-Wilsonian sub-
school. Conversely, support of governments which do not meet their
ideals, even if such support was in the national interest of the United
States, would be immoral.
The real-politick school is composed of hard-nosed realists who are only
interested in protecting our national interest. However, they tend to con-
strue the United States national interest to lie in protecting only the
industrial nations when it is clear that control by our adversaries would
immediately endanger our national security and well-being. Our in-
volvement in remote places such as Vietnam is symptomatic of an over-
commitment which the hard-nosed realists abhor.
The last school is the world-government school dominated by eccentric
Utopians, who believe that if the United Nations were a true world govern-
ment, the problem of peace would be solved.
The one common thread uniting these diverse schools composed of a
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multitude of subschools is their hatred of the Vietnam War. A brief survey
of the literature reveals a vitriol and polemic that has made rational debate
impossible. Yet, whether or not one agrees with the Balance-of-Power
thesis, it is quite easy to dismiss the pacifists, fellow travelers, and world
government schools because they are basically anti-American. They are
not interested in an American national interest and they do not seek to
promote the safety, security or well-being of the American nation in a
world composed of hostile nations.
The Dr. Strangelove School, the neo-Wilsonians and the isolationists
pose extremes which, while nationally oriented, are incapable of preserving
peace. At least it is Mr. Rostow's analysis that peace can better be
preserved by taking the complexities of international political life, and
attempting to balance the competing forces rather than assuming a morally
superior attitude. The real-politick school comes under particularly heavy
attack from Mr. Rostow, because of his view of the implications of political.
and military retrenchment in such areas as the Middle East.
Mr. Rostow's book is a first-rate effort to untangle and categorize the
normative theories on U.S. foreign policy. It takes a very strong stand
without being polemic. It is a candid report by a man who has recently
participated in important decisions affecting our foreign policy.
1973 Survey of Foreign Tax Havens
Marshall J. Langer, Manacon Services Ltd. 1972, 85 pages, $5.00.
Reviewed by L. J. Theberge
If you are not concerned about advising clients on foreign tax havens,
you may still find this 85 page pamphlet fascinating as a guide to little
known places. Only students of foreign tax havens or sophisticated world
travelers will be familiar with the names Turks, Caicos, Montserrat,
Anguilla, Sark, Sealand, Campione, Svalbard, Bahrain, Nauru and Miner-
va.
In a more serious vein, this pamphlet is a very useful guide to approx-
imately forty foreign tax havens located in various regions of the globe
from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean via Europe, the Middle East and
the Far East. Two important parts of this publication are a brief description
of advantages and disadvantages of the listed tax havens and a bibliogra-
phy.
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The use of tax havens by individuals and corporations seeking legitimate
means to minimize tax burdens continues to grow. As industrial societies
seek to impose more egalitarian programs, this trend will continue. In
choosing a foreign tax haven Mr. Langer points out criteria which he
considers of major importance in the selection process: political and eco-
nomic stability, a positive attitude towards tax haven business, absence of
exchange controls, favorable company and trust laws, low costs for in-
corporating and maintaining a corporation, good transportation and com-
munications, good banking facilities, guaranty of tax exemption and no tax
treaties so as to avoid disclosure of information by the tax haven to the tax
authorities in the investor's country.
Out of this list one criterion seems meaningless and it is the one upon
which the author places a great deal of emphasis, viz. the guaranty of tax
exemption. Governments of even the most respectable nations are not
known for keeping guarantees. It would appear that political stability is the
real concern and only if a tax haven has a history of stability will its
guaranty have any significance. It would seem that a politically stable tax
haven with no guaranty of tax exemption would be a more reliable place in
which to locate, than a tax haven with a guaranty but a history of in-
stability.
Tax havens are classified according to the kinds of benefits offered to
clients. Some tax havens have no taxation and others very low rates. There
are tax havens that distinguish between the source of income, exempting
foreign source income from taxation while taxing income derived from
investments made in the tax haven. Finally, there are tax havens which
offer special limited privileges which are nontaxable or taxed at a lower
rate. Examples which the author provides of this type of special privilege
country are Luxembourg and the Netherlands, which are generally not
thought of as tax havens. However, they do offer special incentives to
foreigners.
The Caribbean appears to be the leading area in the world for tax havens
perhaps because it has been a favorite watering spot for the rich from
Europe and America. The Bahamas, Bermuda-which is not exactly in the
Caribbean, and Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos have no direct
taxation, no income tax and no capital gains taxes.
The author points out the difficulties of obtaining sound information
about the advantages or disadvantages of foreign tax havens, since the
sources of information are usually interested parties such as local officials,
lawyers and bankers. (Mr. Langer is Director of Grand Cayman Trust
Corporation Ltd., which is located in one of the major Caribbean tax
havens.) Some of the tax havens discussed by the author are nonexistent.
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Sealand, for example, is a World War 1I fortress located many miles off the
coast of Great Britain in the Thames Estuary.
It once was a private commercial radio station that broadcast popular
music and advertisements to residents of Great Britain before it was put
out of business in 1968. The owner's attempt to turn an uninhabited
concrete slab the size of a baseball diamond into a tax haven country
seems to be more of a publicity stunt than a serious venture. Similarly, the
viability of Minerva, a series of reefs located in the South Pacific, which
the King of Tonga is seeking to annex, makes it doubtful that Minerva will
have any success as a tax haven country.
The forty page bibliography, which takes up half the pamphlet, is an
excellent reference guide for those lawyers interested in foreign tax havens.
If you are seeking more than a survey, this section will have the most
utility. As the author is careful to point out, the needs of each client must
be carefully analyzed and matched with the tax haven most suitable to the
client's needs. Tax havens can only be judged on the basis of how well they
fit a particular requirement.
The publisher intends to publish a more complete reference book on
foreign tax havens which Mr. Langer will write in 1973. In this new book
there will be a chapter on each of the major tax havens.
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